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AN EVALUATION OF THE SWEDISH
ACTIVE LABOR MARKET POLICY:
NEW AND RECEIVED WISDOM
ABSTRACT
About 3% of GM' is spent on government labor market programs in Sweden, compared
to 2% in Germany and less than 0.5% in the U.S. In Sweden these programs include extensive
job training, public sector relief work, recruitment subsidies, youth programs, mobility bonuses,
and unemployment benefits. Using county-level data, we provide new evidence that public relief
workers displace other workers, especially in the construction sector. Our review of the previous
literature suggests that job training programs have small effects on wages and re-employment in
Sweden. but precise inferences are difficult because of small sample sizes. We also investigate
alternative reasons for the stability of the Beveridge Curve in Sweden, and compare regional
evolutions of employment and unemployment in Sweden and the U.S. Lastly, we present cross-
country analysis for 1993 which, contrary to studies that use earlier data, shows that the extent
of a country's active labor market programs is positively associated with the national
unemployment rate.
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SWEDENA visitor to Sweden is struck by the breadth and generosity of the labor market
programs designedto limit the adverseeffects of unemployment and expand employment.
These programs include extensive job training, publicsectorrelief work,recruitment
subsidies, youth programs, mobility bonuses, and unemployment benefits. About 3% of
GNP is spent on government labor market programs in Sweden, compared to 2% in
Germany and less than 0:5% in the U.S. Several prominent observers have argued that the
Swedish active labor market policies are responsible for the enviable unemployment
experience of Sweden in the 1970s and 1980s. Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991, p.
473) go so far as to recommend that Sweden's "active labor market" programs serve as a
model for other countries.
Figure 1 illustrates the Swedish unemployment rate semi-annually over the past 25
years. In the 1970s Sweden managed to maintain a low unemployment rate in the face of
adverse oil price shocks that caused high unemployment and severe recessions in other
industrialized countries. The unemployment rate in Sweden also remained low in the
1980s, while it trended upwards in other European countries. But a dramatic increase in
the unemployment rate can be seen beginning in 1991. In July 1993, the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics calculated that the unemployment rate in Sweden reached 9.5%, on a
comparable basis to the U.S. unemployment concept. The U.S. rate at the same time was
6.8%. For the first time in our lifetimes, the unemployment rate is higher in Sweden than
in the U.S.! The dramatic increase in unemployment in Sweden over the last two years
casts doubt on the ability of the active labor market policies to blunt unemployment. At the
same time, Sweden's history of low unemployment in the 1980s suggests that its labor
market proirams are not responsible for the 199 1-93 downturn because the programs were2
substantially as generous in the 1980s as in the early 1990s.
The expense of the Swedish labor market programs may be justifiable if they
producebenefits that exceed theircosts. But the programs are a very expensive luxury if
unemployment is high and if the programsarenoteffectiveat reducingunemploymentor
raising workers' skills. Given the rising level of unemployment, and other changes in the
Swedish economy, an assessment of the effectiveness of the active labor market programs is
especially timely.
As the pattern in Figure 1 suggests, macroeconomic indicators can give a possibly
misleading indication of the efficacy of Sweden's labor market policies. In this paper we
first review microeconometric evidence on two major active labor market programs in
Sweden: public• relief work and job training. One concern with public relief work is that
such programs may displace other workers. We provide new evidence on "fiscal
substitution" between public relief workers and other workers using couiny-level data.
Specifically, we find evidence that public relief workers tend to displace private
construction workers, which potentially limits the usefulness of public relief workers in
reducing unemployment. The evidence is less clear on whether relief workers displace
social welfare workers, which is another major sector in which relief workers are
dispatched.
We also review previous evidence on the impact of job training programs on wages -.
andre-employment probabilities. Due to small samples used in past studies, we find it very
difficult to draw precise conclusions about the payoff to job training programs. In sum, our
view of the microeconomeiric evidence is that one should remain agnostic about the3
effectiveness of job Iraining and public relief programs in fighting unemployment.
We then attempt to reconcile the macroeconomic and international evidence --which
has beenicited by many as support for the effectiveness of Sweden's active labor market
programs —withthe microeconometric evidence. We first provide evidence on the stability
of the Beveridge Curve in the 1980s across counties in Sweden. One possible explanation
for the stable Beveridge Curve is that rapid expansion of public sector employment has
absorbed unemployed workers. We test this hypothesis with county-level data, and find
little support for it. Second, we evaluate and update the cross-country unemployment rate
analysis that Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) and others have performed. Using 1993
unemployment rate data, we find that greater spending on active labor market programs has
a statistically insignificant and negative impact on unemployment. This finding is in sharp
contrast with estimates for the 1980s. We also discuss several statistical limitations of the
cross-country approach.
Finally, we present evidence on the reaction of employment and unemployment to
regional shocks in Sweden. Specifically, we compare our fmdings on regional evolutions itt
Sweden to comparable results for the U.S. based on Blanchard and Katz (1992) and for the
rest of Europe based on pecressin and Fatas (1993). These results suggest that Sweden's
response to shocks is not particularly different from other countries', implying that
Sweden's extensive labor market programs have not had a marked effect on regional labor
market adjustments.
In our judgment, the evidence provides little support for the view that Sweden's past
success in maintaining low unemployment stemmed primarily from its active labor market4
policies. On the other hand, the extensive labor market programs in Sweden are most
likely not the cause of Sweden's current economic crisis. But our analysisof the evolution
of unemployment suggests there is a real danger that the current high level of
unemployment Will persist for some time in the future. We conclude by considering
policies that might help to improve the active labor market programs in the current
economic climate.
L Overview of Programs
As way of background, it should be noted that within the central blue-collar trade
union (LO) in the early l950s the question of how to combine full employment and price
stability was discussed.' These discussions led to the formulation of a program
subsequently adopted by the Social Democrat government, based on a few cornerstones,
one of which being active labor market policies. First, LO would pursue a so called
"solidaristic wage policy.' In its original form this policy aimed at 'equal pay for equal
work," irrespective of the productivity levels of individual firms. Later, the policy principle
(still under the same name) changed to one of unconditional wage equalization, or "equal
pay for unequal work? Second, a strict stance of stabilization policies (primarily fiscal
policy) was advocated in order to keep inflation low. One intended result of these two
principles was shut-downs of low-productivity firms and layoffs. This motivated the third
cornerstone of the program, active labor market policies," which were given the role of
'See Björklund (1990), Calmfors (1992), flanagan (1987) and Stafford (1981) for
excellent overviews of the labor market programs.5
transferringlaid-offworkers to expandinghigh-productivity firms.
Twopoints about the origin of the programs are worth noting:First,labormarket
policies are not considered a substitute for stabilization policies; second, labor market
policies entail the so called work principle" --theaim of the programs is to accomplish a
smooth and rapid transfer of laid-off workers to new employment rather than to provide
welfare for the unemployed (i.e., "workfarC rather than welfare). Starting in the I 950s a
system of manpower policy emerged based on active labor market policies. The present
system can be described in terms of the following main ingredients: Unemployment
insurance, measures to create employment, mobility enhancing measures, and measures
targeted at the handicapped.
Unemployment insurance
Unemployment compensation is provided in two forms: First, there is a number of
so called certified unemployment insurance (UI) hinds, run by the trade unions at the
industry level, but to a large extent tax financed. In 1990 the coverage was slightly less
than 80% of the labor force. Second, in addition to the UI system administered by the
trade unions, since 1974 there is also a supplementary compensation system, cash benefit
assistance (kontant arbetsmarknadsstod, KAS), mainly designed for new entrants in the
labor market, who usually are not members of any UI hind. U! fund members are entitled
to compensation for 300 days (450 days for workers over age 55) whereas cash benefit
assistance runs for 150 days (300 days for persons Cover age55, 450 days for persons over
age 60). Daily compensation in the UI fund system is, within limits, fixed by the6
government regulating minimum and maximum Levels at 80% (90%before July 5. 1993) of
therecipient's normal incOme prior to unemployment. The level of compensation in cash
benefit assistance is significantly lower than the average paid by the certified UI funds (in
1990 174 versus 402 SEK per day). Carling, et al. (1994) find that the duration of
unemployment spells for those on KAS benefits is only slightly shorter than those on UI
benefits, in spite of the large benefit differential.
A special feature of the UI fund system is that fund coverage roughly coincides with
wage bargaining units, as the funds are run by trade unions at the industry level.But the
state grants to the UI hinds are designed so that the marginal cost of extra unemployment
among a hind's members is zero.'
A number of criteria, many of which are common to the UI hinds and KAS, have to
be met in order that a person be entitled to unemployment compensation. The two most
important conditions are that recipients actively search for a job at a public employment
office, and that an offer of "suitable" work must be accepted. Refusal to accept a job offer
might lead to expulsion from compensation. To receive compensation from a UI fund, a
"membership condition" and a "work condition" have to be met: the claimant must have
paid membership fees to the UI hind for at least 12 months and must have been working
for at least 75 days distributed over at least 4 months and must have been working for at
least 75 days distributed over at least 4 months during the 12 months preceding the current
unemployment spell. Participation in relief work as well as labor market retraining
2Qjig in the UI system initiated in 1994 make membership compulsory, and add
hinds administered by the state.7
programs count as work in this respect.
Workers who do not meet the membership condition are entitled to KAS benefits if
they meet either a work requirement of roughly the same type as for UI find compensation.
or an "education condition." The education condition is met if individuals have finished at
least one year of school in excess of the nine compulsory years and searched for a job at a
public employment office for at least 90 days.
As the duration of compensation is limited, the system also creates incentives to find
a job before compensation runs out.3 This aspect has been stressed by Layard, Nickell and
Jackman (1991) as a key factor behind the high observed Swedish real wage sensitivity to
changes in unemployment. This, in turn, is a potential explanation for Sweden's favorable
unemployment experiences during the l9SOs. It is important to note, however, that the
system has recently changed. Since the late 1980s participation in labor market programs
qualifies for new periods of unemployment compensation, so in principle there is no limit
on the amount of time a jobless person can spend outside the regular labor market by
switching between training and unemployment compensation.4 There is some indirect
evidence supporting this view: Axelsson and Löfgren (1991), studying the effects of
retraining programs on incom; found a significant positive effect on persons finishing
training programs in 1981, whereas Regnér (1993) finds significant negative income effects
for 1989 and 1990 program participants. A possible explanation for this difference is that
3When unemployment compensation runs out, individuals are eligible for social
security, which offers significantly less generous compensation.
the change in the system pertains to training programs; relief work has always been
considered Mwo&"$
in the latter period training qualified for unemployment compensation, so that the negative
income effect reflects negative selection of program participants. Unfortunately, there is a
lack of direct evidence (e.g. in the form of event histories) on the extent of a circular
flow" between unemployment and programs.
Measures to create employment
The principal measure to create employment has for a long time been public relief
work. The primary stated aim is to counteract temporary downturns in labor demand, but
relief jobs have also been targeted for groups with permanently high unemployment risks.
Unemployed UI fund members who run out of unemployment compensation are in principle
granted the right to a relief job. To quali for a relief job one must be registered as an
unemployed job applicant at a public employment office for a minimum number of days
(about a week). The duration of relief jobs is normally capped at 6 months, and payment is
according to collective agreement in the regular labor market. Relief workers are obliged to
accept suitable job offers and can be expelled from relief jobs upon refusal. Relief work
can be arranged by central or local governments, or (rarely) by the private sector. The
typical relief job has traditionally been in building and road construction, but the emphasis
has gradually changed to jobs in health and welfare. From the "workfare" point of view,
relief work offers a "work test": if the employment office fails to find a suitable job for the
applicant, it can test his willingness to work by offering a relief job.
Recruitment subsidies,introducedin 1984, aim at facilitating employment for long-term9
unemployed and at creatingpermanent jobs in the localpublicsectorfor the long-term or
partiallyunemployed. Subsidies normally amount to at most 60% of the total wage cost,
and can be given for a maximum of 6 months.
Beginning in 1984, a variety of special "youth measures" have been used, arid their
use has intensified recently. The most recent form ('introduced in July 1992) is called
"youth practice," and is targeted at youths between 18 and 24 years old. Participants
receive compensation roughly equal to unemployment benefits, and employers receive free
labor. In addition to keeping participants out of unemployment, youth practice offers a
work test of the same kind as relief work. The combination of youth practice and a deep
recession are believed to have weakened significantly the incentives to hire youths.
Finally, since January 1993, unemployed persons can prolong their period of
unemployment compensation by taking part in so called "labor market ventures". These
last for at most 6 months and the participant receives income equivalent to unemployment
compensation benefits. The employer, nonnally organizations, associations, or the public
•
sector, gets free labor. To prevent crowding out, participants are supposed to perform
duties which would otherwise not have been performed. As the number of participants has
increased rapidly, this last condition might prove to pose problems: either participants do
what they are supposed to do, in which case large numbers of people perform superfluous
tasks, or, alternatively, crowding out will prove to be an important issue.
Mobilityenhancing measures
Thetraditional mobility enhancing measure is employment service administration.10
The Swedish employment service is not limitedtojust a brokerage function -.another
important function of it is to administer both unemployment insurance and selection to
labor market programs. A distinguishing feature of the Swedish set-up regarding job
brokerage is that the public employment service has had a legal monopoly position. Since
the late 1970s there has also been compulsory notification of vacancies through the public
employment service.'
Another mobility enhancing measure is "mobility grants/starting allowances." These
grants are intended to facilitate geographical mobility by making moving an economically
feasible alternative• to unemployment in the home region. To qualify, one must be an
unemployed person looking for a job in another region through the public unemployment
service. Other, more strict criteria, such as belonging to certain" scarce' professions, have
also been eligible from time to time.
Last, but not least, among the mobility enhancing measures is labor market
retraining. The official aims are to help unemployed or persons facing unemployment risks
to get a job, help persons with little education or obsolete education to attain a stronger
position in the labor market and to facilitate for firms to find workers with adequate
education. Labor market retraining comes in many different forms and is produced by a
plethora of educational institutions on requisition by county-level authorities under the
National Labor Market Board. Retraining eligibility is conditional on being unemployed or
facing risk of unemployment and job-search through public employment service.
5 .
Oneside benefit of the employment service s monopoly is that Swedish vacancy data are
likely to be of high quality.II
Compensationon retraining programs is roughly equivalent to unemployment compensation.
Measures targeted for the disabled
There are of fourbasicmeasurestargeted for the disabled: employmentin
community enterprises, public sheltered work, wage-subsidized employment, and vocational
rehabilitation. A common feature of these measures is that their goal is to provide work for
persons who, due to various disabilities, have difficulty obtaining employment in the regular
labormarket.
Ouantitative Descriotion
Table I summarizes the magnitude of key labor market programs in Sweden. the
U.S., and Germany in various years. It is clear that Sweden spends much more on training
and unemployment benefits per recipient than the U.S. Sweden's unemployment benefits
are particularly generous by comparison to the U.S.6 Since workers who are in training
programs also qualifr for unemployment benefits, the total amount spent on workers
undergoing training isofthe same order of magnitude as the cost of tuition and room and
board for a year at Harvard!1
Readers may be surprised to see, however, that 1% of the labor force is enrolled in
public training programs in the U.S., which is slightly hither than the comparable figure for
6Sweden reduced its replacement ration by 10 percentage points in 1993, but benefits are
still well above the U.S. level.
'As Richard Freeman has ointed out to us. this is also roughly equivalent to the cost of
a year in a high-security prison.12
Sweden or Germany. This fact casts some doubtonthe relative importance of "disguised
unemployment" in labor market programs in Sweden. Even if one counted all of the
Sweden's workers who are on training or public relief programs as unemployed, the
unemployment rate in the 1980s would have increased only by roughly 1%. Thus,
disguised unemployment cannot account for much of Sweden's historically low
unemployment rate.
Although the proportion of the labor force receiving training is about the same. a
much higher proportion of the unemployed undergo training in a given year in Sweden than
in the U.S. In 1990, government training participants were 62% as large as the number of
unemployed workers. Moreover, a sizable proportion of the unemployed are also placed in
public relief jobs in Sweden, a program for which there is no current analog in the US.
Sweden devotes about 3% of GNP to labor market programs, which exceeds Germany
(2.1%) and the U.S. (.4%). The increase in unemployment in Sweden in the past two years
can be expected to cause a substantial increase in expenditures on labor market programs
relative to GNP.
The changing importance of some of the main Swedish labor market programs is
illustrated in Figure 2. The figure presents the proportion of the labor force that is directly
involved in retraining, relief work, youth programs, or recruinent subsidies. A number of
features stand out. First, relief work shows a clear counter-cyclical pattern. Second, the
incidence of relief work has trended steadily downward in the I 980s. Third, labor market
retraining has not had the same cyclical variability as relief work, again except for the past
few years. Fourth, the incidence of retaining gradually tended upward in the I 980s. As al 3
result of these contrasting trends, the relative importance of retraining has grown in the
1980s and 1990s, while the relative importance of public relief work has declined. Sixth,
there has been a dramatic increase in the prevalence of youth measures in recent years.
Finally, the incidence of retraining and youth measures declined in 1993. This decline was
panty a result of budgetary cutbacks and partly a result of greater participation in"labor
market ventures."
II. Theoretical Framework
The Swedish labor market programs are diverse and extensive. It is important to
consider each program in this overall context. For example, one must recognize that
solidarity wage policy is likely to set a floor on wages; workers whose productivity level
fall below this floor will find it difficult to obtain employment (see Edin and Topel, 1994).
Thus, the benefit of raising worker productivity through government training, say, is greater
given the pre-existing wage rigidity. Similarly, wage subsidies to employers of low-wage
employees will relax the constraint imposed by the solidarity policy, and thus could
increase employment and enhince efficiency.
Moreover,the socialcost of unemployment (or low productivity) is especially high
in Sweden because unemployed workers qualify for generous transfer benefits, retraining,
and public relief work. The high income tax also raises the social cost of unemployment or
low productivity because tax revenue is foregone, which requires even higher tax rates
(which in turn probably cause further labor supply distortions). And the fact that income
taxes are progressive reduces the incentive to invest in human capital and search for better14
payingjobs. The adverse effectsofthesedistortionscould be reduced by effective
governmentintervention to encourage training, mobility and employment.'
If one takes the network of government programs as given, then the proper
theoretical framework is to start from a situation with pre-existing distortions. As is well
known, in this second-best setting government intervention could improve economic
efficiency. In this framework, the benefits of successful labor market programs in Sweden
are potentially greater than in the U.S., which may explain why the Swedish labor market
programs are more extensive. But if the external environment changes, such as a reduction
in marginal tax rates or unemployment benefits --ashas been the case in Sweden -.then
this theoretical framework suggests that the social benefit of active labor market programs
may be reduced.
One must also consider possible indirect effects of labor market programs on wage
and employment outcomes. Theoretical bargaining models predict that labor market
programs will exert upward pressure on wages. Aggregate time-series studies provide some
empirical support for this prediction (Caimfors and Forslund (1991), Calmfors (1992) and
Calmfors and Lang (1993)), although Edin, Holmlund, and Oslros's (1992) county-level
analysis finds that labor market programs do not put upward pressure on wage bargains. It
is thus possible that labor market programs cause higher wages and depress employment.
The total social costs and benefits of labor market programs must be compared to
'Notice, however, that the government intdvention does not necessarily have to involve
government-provided fraijtg. For example, the government could provide vouchers to
individuals for private training, or the government could lower tuition costs through grams or
loans.Is
determinetheir optimal level.Rationaldesign of policy would take into accowit the
efficacyof labor market programs. If, on the margin, a kronor spent on retraining has a
higher reward than a kronor spent on public relief work, then the retraining program shoul4
receive a larger share of the available resources. Such cost-benefit comparisons are
especially important given the rising expense of labor market programs, and the rising
government budget deficit Next we present an evaluation of the effectiveness of retrainint
programs and publicreliefworks, drawing on the past literature and some new analysis.
III. Disolacement Effects of Public Relief Workers
There was a large shift away from public relief work and toward job training in the
1980s. Nevertheless, over 10% of unemployed workers are placed on public relief jobs in
1990, and there is some discussion of expanding public relief in response to the current
economic crisis. One potential drawback of public relief work is that public relief workers
may displace private sector workers. There is an extensive literature on this topic in the
U.S.. beginning with Johnson and Tomola (1977). The theoretical argument is
straightforward: If the public sector provides relief workers to a local government agency or
private sector flrni the local government or private firm will hire fewer workers than it
otherwise would have hired.
Johnson and Tomola conclude that public sector employment, programs used in the
U.S. in 1966-75 tended to displace other workers, on net creating few additional jobs after
6 quarters. This conclusion is not without controversy. Borus and Hamennesh (1978)
argued that Johnson and Tomola's estimates are sensitive to their Almon lag specification,16
and nonrobustbecauseoftong multicollinearityin their aggregate time-series data.
Adams, eta1.(1983)estimatedisplacement effects usinga panel datasetofannual
observations on cities 1970-79. They find that public sector employment grants in 1978
and 1979 had a significant negative effect on payrolls, but not in 1977. In 1978, for
example, 77 cents of every dollar in public sector employment grants was reflected in
higher city payrolls. They attribute the finding of less of a displacement after 1977 to a
redesign of the program, which tightened eligibility and required specific projects.
There has been only one previous study of displacement effects of public relief
workers in Sweden. That study, by Gramlich and Ysander (1981), analyzes 14 annual time
series observation from 1964 to 1977. They focus on the two largest categories of public
relief expenditures and employment: health and welfare workers and road construction
workers. They estimate aggregate time series models, similar to Johnson and Tomola.
Gramlich and Ysander find evidence of considerable displacement in road construction, but
not in the health and welfare sector.
We investigate the displacement effects of public relief workers using annual data
for 24 counties in Sweden over the period 1976-1991 for all construction workers, and over
the period 1982-1990 for health and welfare workers.9 Specifically, we estimate
employment equations of the form:
(1) Eft=I%+l3lPRW +w÷pç+÷;+
'Thehellth and welfare workers series is shorter because of comparability problems with
the county-level data in earlier years.17
where E is employment in county i in year t, PRW11 is the total number of public relief
workers in county i in year t-l, W is the log of the average real wage in county i in year t,
and X, is a vector of cyclical demand measures, such as the unemployment rate and
vacancy rate. We also include unrestricted county fixed effects (gj and unrestricted year
effects (rJ. Equation (1) is estimated separately for construction workers and for health and
welfare workers. Relief workers should not be counted among the workers included in the
dependent variable. Thus, fiscal substitution (i.e., displacement) will imply a negative
coefficient on PRW, and complete fiscal substitution will imply a coefficient of -1.0. We
have also experimented with specifications using various lags of public relief workers, and
with subsets of the covariates.
Results for construction workers are presented in Table 2. Each specification shows
a negative and statistically significant coefficient on public relief workers, implying
substantial displacement. Column 6, which includes the largest set of covariates, indicates
that .69 fewer private construction workers are employed for every additional public relief
worker hired. The lowest estimate of displacement we find is -.36, in specifications where
we omit the year effects.
The results for health and welfare workers, reported in Table 3, are much less clear.
The estimated displacement effect for health and welfare workers is not stable when
different sets of covariates are included —itbounces from -2.26 to +.9l. Moreover, the
standard errors are quite large, and the estimated effect is statistically insignificant in
column 6, which includes the full set of covariates. Unfortunately, it is difficult to draw
much of a conclusion on the extent Of displacement for this group of workers.18
One potential problem with ourestimatesof displacementis that causality may run
in the reverse direction. A prolonged downturn in the economy may stimulate the use of
relief workers, thus generating a negative correlation between (lagged) relief workers and
non-relief employment. We include cyclical demand measures (unemployment and vacancy
rates)in the regressions to control for this possibility. Nevertheless, in a highly cyclical
industry like construction, reverse causality may still be a concern. To explore this issue
further we also estimated vector autoregressions for employment and relief workers in each
sector. These estimates are reported in Table 4. The results indicate that lagged relief
workers and lagged employment have a statistically significant effect in the employment
equations, but lagged employment does not have a statistically significant effect in the relief
worker equations. This finding suggests that causality does not run from employment to
relief workers, but with our relatively short time period it is hard to draw r conclusions
from the vector autoregressions.
As a final check on the plausibility of our estimates, we estimated a vector
autoregression for the durable manufacturing sector, an industry that is jdirectlyaffected
by public relief workers. Since the durable manufacturing sector is highly cyclical, this
industry provides a test of whether our previous results for the construction industry are
spuriously reflecting cyclical patterns. The p-value for a joint test of three lags of the
public relief variable in the employment equation for durable manufacturing workers is I 1
(F'2.03). The corresponding test for construction workers has a p-value of .0000 (N9.07).
These results suggest that the effect of relief workers on construction employment is not
just spuriously reflecting the business cycle.19
To summarize, we find evidence of substantial displacement in the construction
sector, but not in the health and welfare sector. This conclusion is very much like
Oramlich and Ysander's, even though we analyze data for a more recent time period.
exploit county-level data, and use different estimation methods.
IV. Job Training
In view of the large amount of resources devoted to job retraining in Sweden, one
would expect to find a vastmicroeconometricliterature on the effectiveness of training
programs. This is not the case. There have been only about one half dozen studies ofthe
impact of job training on earnings with Swedish data. These studies use a variety of
econometric models and data sets, and some studies use several estimation techniques. In
Sweden as in the U.S., there is considerable uncertainty regarding the proper estimation
method and specification for estimating the "treatment effect" of job training. But in
Sweden problems of imprecise estimates are at least as important as model specification. In
summarizing the literature, we report fixed effects estimates when multiple estimates were
available.'0
Figure 3 summarizes the past literature on the impact of jobtrainingon earnings.
The figure shows the estimated payoff to training as a proportion of earnings, with a bound
of plus or minus two standard ettors around the estimate. As a benchmark for these
estimates, one should bear in mind that if job training raises participants' annual earnings
by 3% for 20 years, then the present value of the payoff to the training roughly equalsits
'°See Bjorklund(1990) forathoughtful summaryof this literature.20
costs."Thus,oneshouldhope that studieshave enough precision to detect payoffs on the
orderof 3%. Unfortunately, there is a wide range of estimates, andeachof the estimates
hasalarge standard error. Two of the estimates are significantly below .03. and one is
significantlyabove .03.
Toimprovethe precision oftheestimates, wecalculatedtheweightedaverage of the
estimates, using as weights the inverse sampling variance of the estimate. (We also
calculated the standard error of the weighted-average estimate.) This is reported as study 6.
The weighted average payoff is slightly negative (-.8%). but not statistically different from
zero (std. errorl.2%). One could, however, reject the null hypothesis of a payoff on the
order of 3% using the weighted average of the estimates. On the other hand, the arithmetic
average of the estimated effects in the studies is positive, but it is not statistically different
from zero or from 3%.
These studies show that there is not enough support to reject the null hypothesis that
training has no effect on participants' subsequent earnings. If we use the weighted average
of the estimates, we would reject the null hypothesis that the payoff is on the order of 3%,
which is roughly the break even level for the training programs.
individually, the studies of earnings lack sufficient power to reach a convincing
conclusion on this critical issue. A high priority for researchers in Sweden should be the
construction of data sets that permit precise estimates on the effect of job trainingprograms.
"In making this calculation, we assume that the typical participantearns $15,000 per year.
that job training increases annual earnings permanently by 3%, and that the individual works
for 20 years. If we apply a real interest rate of 3% to future earnings, thepresent value of the
payoff to training is $6,695, which exceeds theavenge cost of $6,568 in 1990.This
calculation ignores the time costs of participants while they undergo training.21
The following calculation indicates approximately how large a sample is required to draw
reasonably precise inferences2 Suppose a standard error of about 1% is desired. If we
take Regnér's (1993) sample and estimates as representative, we would need a sample of
roughly 41,000observationsto achieve a standard error of .01, compared to the actual
sample of 5,000 observations. We feel that Bjorklund's (1990; p. 12) recommendation is
worth repeating, "More attention must be paid to these --lessglamorous --issuesof data
quality in order to get estimates of reasonable precision." In light of Heckrnan and Smiths
(1993) finding that JTFA experimental and nonexperimental evaluations yield similar results
when the comparison sample for nonexperimental sample is carefully selected, we feel this
suggestion is particularly prescient.
There is an even smaller set of studies to review that examine the effect of training
on subsequent employment probabilities. A careful study by Bjorklund (1989) finds that
retraining programs raise the probability participants are subsequently employed by 4.4-5.5
percent if a linear control function is estimated and by 2-8 percent if a fixed effectsmodel
is estimated, depending on the period. Only the 8% estimate is significantly different from
0, however. Duration models estimated by Korpi (1992) indicate that longer experience in
labor market programs is associated with greater employment stability for youths in
Stockholm, and that youths who found jobs directly after participating in manpower
programs tended to stay on the jobs longer.
Until sufficient data are available to make precise estimates for Sweden, we believe
12Another issue to consider is the proper statistical methods and specification to estimate
the payoff to job training.22
that estimates for the U.S. could prove informative for Sweden. The U.S. literature
consistently finds thatjobtraining programs have their largest payoff for women. Men
tend to havesmallerpayoffs, and the available estimates for youths suggest that training has
no effect, or possibly negative effects, on their subsequent labor market outcomes (see
LaLonde, 1992). Although the selection into training programs and the content of programs
in Sweden are likely to be quite different, the American estimates may provide a rough
indication of the likely returns in Sweden. In the absence of compelling evidence to the
contrary, we suspect that a similar qualitative pattern will hold in Sweden. Moreover, the
small payoff to training based on the weighted-average study in Figure 3 is consistent with
the modest payoffs found in the American literature. All of this suggests to us that one
should not expect heroic returns from job training programs. The benefits may justify the
costs (especially in Sweden because of pre-existing distortions noted earlier), but the returns
are likely to be in the neighborhood of 3% higher income per year.
V. Beveride Curve
The stability of the unemployment-vacancy relationship, or Beveridge curve, is one
of the features of the Swedish labor market that many observers have pointed to. One
possible explanation for the stable Beveridge curve in Sweden is that active labor market
policies have improved the matching of workers to vacancies. But there are alternative
explanations as well. First, the public relief jobs and training programs may mask
unemployed workers. Second, public sector employment has grown rapidly in Sweden,
with the percent of Swedish workers directly employed by the government increased from23
20% in 1965to 38.2%in 1985. The increase in public sector employmentis even more
dramaticfor women, rising from 29.5% in 1965 to 54.8% in 1985. Government
employmentmay have soaked upworkers who otherwise would be unemployed, preventing
an outwardshiftin theBeveridge curve)3 Weexplorethesealternativeexplanations for
thestable Beveridge curve.
Weconsidertwosources of unemploymentdata:labor force survey data and register
data. Panel A of Figure 4 documentsthestability of the Beveridge curve usingbiannual
unemploymentdatafrom the labor force survey. Panel Bof Figure 4contains the
correspondingplot using registerdata. The unemployed counted in theregisterdata consist
of people lookingfor work and immediatelyavailable to takea job. In both figures the
vacancy rateis measured by the number of vacancies listed in the register divided by the
laborforce.
Theunemployment-vacancy rate relationship is fairly stable over time when the
unemployment rate is derivedfromthe labor force survey. The register data, by contrast.
indicate that the unemployment-vacancy relationship shifted in somewhat between 1990 and
1992 (see Panel B). Both of these patterns present a sharp contrast with most other
industrialized countries, ivhich experienced a shift out of the unemployment-vacancy locus
inthe 1970s and 1980s. We utilize the register data in our county-level analysis because
the relatively small sample size in the labor force survey would induce considerable
samplingvariability in county-levelestimates. Our goalthenis to explain why the
BeveridgecurvehasshiftedinforSweden.
"This explanationis hypothesizedbyLindbeck(1990)andOECD(1992), forexample.24
Table5presentsestimates of the Beveridge curve using county-level data for
Sweden for 1981-91. In the first four columns the unemployment rate derived from the
registers is the dependent variable. Columns 5 and 6 contain estimates that use a broader
measure of the unemployment rate as the dependent variable; the broader measure also
counts workers on public relief jobs, training programs, and youth programs as among the
unemployed. Results with either dependent variable cast some doubt on the importance of
public sector employment for the stability of the Beveridge curve in Sweden.
The regression reported in column (1) reveals a negatively sloped relationship
between the unemployment rate and the vacancy rate. Notice that the coefficient on the
linear time trend reported in column (2) indicates that the county-level Beveridge curve has
shifted in, as expected from Panel B of Figure 4. In the model in column (3) we substitute
a variable measuring the proportion of workers in the county who are employed in the
public sector for thetime trend. The estimates in column (3) are consistent with the view
that public sector employment has absorbed unemployed workers, as the public sector share
has a negative and statistically effect on the county unemployment rate. However, once we
add a linear year trend to the model in Column (4), the public sector employment variable
changessign.Moreover, the year trend is hardly affected by the inclusion of the public
sector employment variable. In columns (4) and (5) we use the broader definition of the
unemployment rate. These results also indicate that the Beveridge curve has shifted in, and
that the proportion of workers employed in the public sector has a positive effect on
unemployment when a linear time trend is included.
From the estimates in Table 5,onemay be tempted to conclude that a growing25
public sector absorbed many unemployed, workers, only that the growth in public sector
employment was roughly constant making it difficult to distinguish from a linear time
trend. In otherwords, includingboth public sector employment and the time trend causes a
multicollinearity problem. Although this interpretation is possibly correct, the time path of
public sector employment differed across counties, enabling us to estimate the model with
both variables in columns (4) and (6).importantly,the standard error of the estimate for
the proportion in the public sector increases only slightly once the time trend is added to
the model, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a serious problem.
We are also, aware that a valid criticism of the regressions in Table 5isthat public
sector employment is possibly an endogenous variable. Nevertheless, we consider these
results suggestive that growing public sector employment does not account for the inward
shift of the Swedish Beveridge curve. In addition, when we use a broader measure of
unemployment —onethat includes program participation as well as open unemployment
we still find that the Beveridge curve has shifted in. Thus, we have no satisfactory
explanation for the time-trend in the Bevetidge curve in Sweden.
Although the reasons for Sweden's unemployment-vacancy relationship are unclear,
we should stress that a stable or inward shift of the Beveridge curve is not necessarily a
virtue if the unemployment rate has increased. if the Beveridge curve had shifted out, at
least there would be substantial job vacancies at the prevailing high unemployment rate, and
the issue would be matching people to jobs. But in Sweden's current economic
environment the level of vacancies is low and the level of unemployment is high. Unless
we were confident of steps that would move the Swedish labor market down along a stable26
Beveridgecurve, this is not a desirable situation.
VI.International Evidence on Active Labor Market Programs
Our main approach in this paper has been to try to measure the impact that specific
labor market programs (such as public relief work) have on key outcome variables (such as
construction worker employment). For the programs ..nd outcome measures that we have
been able to study,thisanalysis provides little support for the view that Sweden's labor
market policies have greatly enhanced the operation of the labor market. Most of the
favorable impression of active labor market policies, however, is due to a different
approach --cross-countyanalyses. In these studies, an aggregate measure of a country's
labor market performance (usually the unemployment rate) is related to institutional
characteristics of the country, such as variables measuring the extent of its active labor
market programs, and other economic variables (e.g. Bean, Layard and Nickell, 1986, and
Layard. Nickell and Jackman, 1991). The international evidence has generally found that
countries with greater spending on active labor market policies tend to have lower
unemployment. In this section we review, update, and evaluate the international evidence
on the effectiveness of labor market programs.
In their influential book, Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991, Cli. I) present a cross-
country regression of the average unemployment rate for 1983-88 on a variable measuring
active labor market programs and several other variables. Their sample consists of 20
OECD countries. Active labor market programs are measured by expenditures on these
programs per unemployed person relative to GDP per capita in 1987. Their regression27
coefficients (t-ratios in parentheses) are reported below:
Unemployment rate (%) =0.24(0.1)
+0.92(2.9) benefit duration (years)
+0.17(7.1) replacement ratio (%)
-0.13(2.3) active labor market spending (%)
+2.45(2.4) coverage of collective bargaining (1-3)
-1.42(2.0) union co-ordination (1-3)
-4.28(2.9) employer co-ordination (1-3)
-0.35(2.8) change in inflation (% points)
R2-adj. =0.91; s.c.=1.41; N =20.
The statistically significant point estimate on the active labor market variable implies that
the derivative of the unemployment rate with respect to the share of the labor force in
programs equals -1.5, so that the reduction in open unemployment exceeds the direct effect
of lifting people out of unemployment by means of active labor market policies (see
Calmfors, 1994, footnote 18).
In related work, Zetterberg (1993) pools time-series data for 19 OECD counties for
the period 1985-1991, and regresses unemployment on the ratio of expenditures on active
labor market measures relative to total expenditures on labor market policies. Consistent
with Layard, et aL, he finds that as the share of expenditures on labor market policies
increases, the national unemployment rate declines.28
Wethink there are two major weaknesses with the cross-country analyses which
limit theirusefulness in evaluating active labormarketprograms. The first problem arises
because the source of variability in the countries' labor market policies isunclear. In this
situation, one would like to control for a great many variables that mightinfluence the
unemployment rate and national labor market policy. However, with only20 observations.
the number of variables that one can hold constant is greatly restricted.
A related issue is that cause and effect in the cross-country regressions are very
difficult to ascertain. If a nation is in a prolonged downturn, it may be difficult to deny
generous unemployment insurance benefits to unemployedworkers. In this scenario, high
unemployment causes high UI replacement rates and long benefit durations, notvice versa.
A possible approach to solving this simultaneity bias problem would be to instrument for
the labor market variables, but valid instrumental variables are difficult to find for this
problem.
A similar concern arises with the active labor market variables. As pointed Grubb
(1993) and OECD (1993) point out, spending on active labor market measures tends to rise
less than in proportion with unemployment in most OECD countries. As spending on
unemployment benefits typically varies approximately in proportion to unemployment, this
has induced a negative correlation between unemployment and spending on active labor
market measures per unemployed worker, and between unemployment and the share of total
labor market program expenses devoted to active labor market programs."
'This point is demonstrated in OECD (1993, Annex 2.A), which shows that the significant
effect of active labor market programs found by Layard, et ai. vanishes when spending on
active labor market programs is instead related to the total wage bill.29
Our second, and perhaps more important concern, is that the cross-country evidence
on the active labor market programs is not very stable over time. The cross-country
evidence has been conducted mainly using data for the l980s, when the unemployment rate
in Sweden and other countries with extensive active labor market programs was relatively
low. The situation has changed quite dramatically in the early I 990s. To probe the
stability of the international evidence, we have conducted a cross-country analysis of the
1993 unemployment rate that is similar in spirit to the work of Layard, Nickell, and
Jackman (1991) and Zetterberg (1993)
Specifically, we regress the unemployment rate in 1993 on two measures of active
labor market programs, the change in inflation, and the same institutional variables used by
Layard, Nickell, and Jachnan (1991). For comparison, we present corresponding estimates
for the years 1983-88, the period analyzed by Layard, Nickell, and Jackman. We measure
the importance of active labor market programs in two ways. First, we calculate the
fraction of (}DP spent on active labor market programs. Second, we use Zetterberg's
(1993) variable, which equals the share of expenditures on active labor market measures
relative to total expenditure on labor market programs. Both of these measures have
problems. Most obviously, active labor market expenditures relative to C}DP may rise when
unemployment rises because more people become eligible for programs --thesimultaneity
problem we noted previously. The simultaneity bias is likely to impart the opposite biasfor.
the share of expenditures on active labor market programs relative to total expenditures on
labor market programs. But bear in mind that our main interest here is in examining
whether the effect of the active labor market variables has changed between the 1980's and30
1993,not whether the estimates are biased at any one time.'5
Table6 summarizesthemain regression results)6 The table indicates a striking
change in the coefficients for the active labor market variables. In the 1983-88 period both
active labor market variables have a negative association with unemployment, whereas they
bothhave a positive association in 1993. The t-ratio for a test of the difference between
theestimates fortheactivelaborvariableinColumns(3)and (4) is 1.89. It is also worth
noting that the union coverage and unioncoordinationvariables have changedsignsand
become statistically insignificantin 1993.On the other hand, the duration and generosity
of unemployment insurancebenefits continueto have a positive association withthe
unemploymentrate, and an increase in the inflation rate continuestohave a negative(albeit
statistically insignificant) effect on the national unemployment rate in1993.
One couldargue that 1993is anaberration —thattheinternational evidence in other
years suggests that active labor market programs have reduced unemployment. But together
with the statisticalissues that we raisedpreviously,wethinkthe results of theupdated
cross-country regressions challenge the favorable impression of active labor market
programs thatseveral observershave drawn frominternationalcomparisons.
"The correlation between Layard, Nickel! and Jackman's active labor market variable
(expenditures on.active labor market programsperunemployed worker relative to GD? per
capita in 1982) and ours (the fraction of GD? devoted to active labor market programs circa
1993) is .82.
"Because the sample size is small, in each mode! we use the largest available sample. This
leads to different samples of countries in different years. However, our results are qualitatively
smu!ar when we restrict the samples to a common set of countries.31
VII. Comparison ofRegional Evolutions
Finally,we examine the responsiveness of employment and unemployment to
regional shocks in Sweden. This analysis is motivated by two issues. First, if Swedens
labor market policies are unusually successful, we would expect economic shocks to have
less persistent effects in Sweden than in other countries. Second, Sweden's past record of
adjustment to economic shocks may tell us something about how the labor market will react
to the current economic downturn.
Specifically, we investigate the evolution of employment and unemployment using
pooled time-series and cross-sectional data for the 24 counties in Sweden. As a first look,
Figure 5presentsa plot of the unemployment rate in 1992 against the unemployment rate
in 1976 using data on each of the 24 counties in Sweden. There is considerable persistence
in the level of unemployment across regions in Sweden. This is similar to the pattern
found for regions in the France. Germany, Spain, and the U.K. by Decressin and Fatas
(1993), but quite different from the pattern for states in the U.S. found by Blanchard and
katz. Figure 6 shows a plot of each county's percentage growth in employment 1983-91
against its growth between 1976-83. There appears to be little persistence in employment
growth rates across counties in Sweden. Again, the pattern for Sweden more closely
resembles the European pattern found by Decressin and Fatas than the U.S. pattern found
by Blanchard and Katz.
Following Blanchard and KAtz (1992). we define Aib as the change between year
and t-1 in the logarithm of employment in county i minus the change in the logarithm of
employment in Sweden nationwide between year t and t- 1. We estimate the same32
univariate process for employment as Blanchard and Katz:
(2) A11=+ 3(L)Mi,.,-c
wherewe allow four lags in &_,,arepresents a county fixed effect, and Ekisau
idiosyncratic error term)7
Results are presentedinTable 7, and the implied impulse response function is
shown graphically in Figure 7. For comparison, we also report Blanchard and Katz's
estimates for the 50 U.S. states. Regional shocks to relative employment have lasting
effects in Sweden; they are 86% of their original size after 20 years. In the U.S. regional
employment shocks also have permanent effects, but they tend to be amplified over time.
Interestingly, Decressin and Fatas (1993) find that the Swedish pattern is more typical of
other European countries." The U.S. would thus seem to be the outlier here, not Sweden.
Next we examine the evolution of relative unemployment rates. Specifically, we
follow Blanchard and Katz and estimate:
(3)Pit i#it4 +I32MI.2+c
'1A Dickey-Fuller test did not reveal aunitroot in the Swedish county-level employment-
series.Nevertheless, we estimate the same specifications as Blanchard and Katz for
comparability.
11Decrssjji and Fatas's results are not directly comparable to our estimates and to
Blanchard and Katz's because they deviate regional employment from county-specific
coefficients times aggregate European employment But their country coefficients are close
to one, and they report similar restilts for the U.S. as Blanchard and Katz when they apply their
procedure to U.S. data.33
where .s, is the unemploymentrate in countyi inyeart minus the aggregate unemployment
rate in Sweden in year t, a1 is a county effect, and and js,.2 are one and two year lags
of the relative unemployment rate.
As shown in Table 7 (Columns (3) and (4)) and Figure 8. the relative unemployment
rate series inbothSweden and the U.S. displays lcss persistence than the relative
employment growth series. Half of the impact of an innovation in a countys relative
unemployment rate is predicted to dissipate three years after the initial shock. Ten years
after a shock, the innovation is predicted to have completely dissipated.
The implied impulse response functions for the unemployment rate are quite similar
in Sweden and the U.S., and Decressin and Fatas find a similar pattern for regional data in
several European counties. Our findingof similarregional evolutions in the relative
unemployment rate series inSweden,the U.S..andEurope suggests that activelabormarket
programs inSwedenhavenothad amarkedeffect on unemployment adjustment inregional
labormarketsin Sweden.
VII.Conclusions
Weconcludebyconsidering whatour reviewofthe literature and original analysis
imply for the current problems facing the Swedish labor market. We also consider possible
lessons from Sweden's experiences for labor market policy in the U.S. and elsewhere.
One important question that we can partially address is whether the recent dramatic
increase in unemployment in Sweden is likely to have a persistent effect. We can base our
estimate on the estimated unemployment rate equation in Table 7 if we make two strong34
assumptions:(1)the regional shocks that identi& the autoregressive models in Table 7 have
similar effects as the shocks causing the current depressionin theSwedish labor market;
and (2) the 7 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate in Sweden between 1990
and 1993 is the entire innovation to the unemployment rate series. If these assumptions are
valid, the coefficients in Table 7 imply that the Swedish unemployment rate will gradually
decline, but will still be at historically high levels for at least the next few years, and
probably longer.
Our analysis also suggests that the active labor market programs are not as effective
at combatting unemployment or enhancing workers' skills as some observers believe. How
might certain policy changes affect the labor market programs, especially in the current
high unemployment environment? The answer to this question is particularly important if
the high rate of unemployment persists in the future. Indeed, relatively generous
unemployment benefits (compared to the U.S.) is a reason why one might expect the high
rate of unemployment to persist.
First, Sweden's UI find benefits are very generous by U.S. standards and are
available for a long duration. Benefits last for 300 days, which is more than twice the
maximum duration of unemployment benefits in the U.S. Furthermore, the maximum
duration of unemployment benefits in Sweden may be effectively longer given the
possibility of re-qualifring for benefits after working on public relief jobs or undergoing
retraining. The extent to which individuals rotate between receiving unemployment benefits
and participating in labor market programs should be investigated, if this appears to be a
widespread phenomenon, one possible response would be to limit the total duration that35
individuals may receive unemployment benefits in a specified window of time.
A second possible response is an expanded set of programs to encourage
entrepreneurial activity by unemployed workers. Experimental evidence and experience in
the thS.suggeststhat a minority of unemployed workers are interested in self-employment.
and that government assistance can help to increase the number of unemployed who start
their own businesses- For example, the state of Washington has had favorable results from
providing unemployment benefits in a lump sum to those who are interested in obtaining
seed capital to start their own business (U.S. Department of Labor, 1992). In addition,
training in business, activities and other support services may prove useful. The sociai
reward to pursuing this kind of a policy is likely to be greater in Sweden where high
marginal tax rates discourage entrepreneurial ventures. Another possible issue to study is
that to encourage more entrepreneurial activities the government might allow some "tax and
regulation havens" in which start-up businesses are exempted from tax and regulatory
requirements for a specified period of time. Although only a small minority of the
unemployed could possibly become successful entrepreneurs, this is a margin in which
employment could possibly be expanded, especially in a downturn.
Third, our review of studies of training lead us to the same conclusion reached by
Robert Flanagan six years ago: "There is disappointingly little evidence that these
expenditures have improved the productivity of the Swedish work force.' Although the
handful of studies on the impact of training employ state-of-the-art statistical methods, the
data have proved insufficient for deriving precise estimates of the payoff to training-
Aggregating over several studies, we conclude that the payoff is modest, at best. The US.36
evidence supports a similarconcluMon.Furthennore, the immediate benefitofjobtraining
when the labor market is weak is likely to be smaller than when the labor market is strong.
An important question is whether some training expenditures could be more profitably
redirected,perhaps toward programsthat would stimulate aggregate demand. From a
research standpoint, it would be useful if any policy changescouldbe implementedinsuch
away as tofacilitate evaluationof the impact of thepolicies. Specifically, thismay
include selection of individuals for certain policiesbasedon an arbitrary criterion(e.g.,
birthday fallsafter certain date) and administrative monitoringofnonparticipantsand
programexhausteesfor datacollectionpurposes and subsequent analysis. Finally, our
results and those of Gramlich and Ysander (1981) suggest that in the past public relief
workers have displaced other workers, on net creating few new jobs in the consiruction
sector. It is possible that displacement effects could be limited by requiring local
governments to propose new projects in order to quali for relief workers. If public relief
work assumes a greater role in the current downturn, this issue would be worthy of further
study.
What does our analysis imply for the U.S.? The U.S. seems to be moving in the
opposite direction of Sweden, having recently elected a President with a platform of
"putting people first" by improving the skills of the work force. In addition, unemployment
benefits have recently been extended in the U.S. in some regions, whereas the level of
benefits was recently cut in Sweden. It is possible that both countries are moving in the
"optimal" direction, since the active labor market programs in the U.S. are much smaller
than those in Sweden. The optimal level of labor market programs may lie somewhere in37
betweenthe twocountries.Nevertheless, Sweden's experience that active labor market
programsatone are not capable of fendingoffhighlevelsof unemployment shoutd be
instructive to the U.S. and other countries. Countries should not expect supernormal returns
fromgovernment labor market programs. Policy makers in eastern European countries who
look to Sweden as a model for labor market institutions would be well advised to keep this
lesson inmind.38
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510,843 $17,655 52,111 S12,7B2
Average training costs
per recipiente
$9,214 $6,568 $2,035 NA
Trainees as a proportion of
labor forced
0.0085 0.0094 0.0103 0.0132
Trainees as a proportion of
unemployedd
0.32 0.62 0.19 0.16
Public relief workers as
a proportion of unemployed
0.39 0.12 0 "0 0.04
Proportion of GNP devoted to
labor market policies
0.039 0.025 0.004 0.021
a. All monetary figures are in 1990 U.S.dollars.Swedish kronor
were converted to dollars using the exchange rate, and were
converted from 1982 to 1990 dollars with the CPI-U.
b. Only certified UI fund benefits are included for Sweden.
c. Net training coot are reported for Sweden (i.e., average
unemployment benefits have been subtracted off) .ForU.S.,
training programs include JTPA and Job Corps.
d. Only trainees who receive government compensation are included for
Germany.Table 1 --continued
e. policies included in U.S4 figure are: job training, summer youth
employment, unemployment benefits, and employment services. Policies
included in Sweden figure include: job training, relief, worker, youth
measures, unemployment benefits, and handicapped programs. Policies
included for Germany include: unemployment benefits, retraining.
employment services, pre-retirement benefits, subsidized employment
programs, compensation for short-time workers, compensation of
construction workers during inclement weather, and administrative costs.
Sources: Unemployment benefit data for U.S. are from 1991 Green
Book, p. 466. Training data for the U.S. are from 1991 Green
Book,pp.1454-1456. and pertain to ,TrPA LEA, and Y1TA Its, and
Job Corps programs. Swedish data are from Statistisk Arsbok 1992
and OECD Economic Surveys. Germandataare from Stptjstisches .Yahrbuch
flflandZahl!n zur Wirtschaftlichtlichen Entwicklunc der
Bunderirepublik Deutschland 1992, Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft.Table 2
DisplacementEffects of Public Relief Workers
DependentVariable: Number of Private Construction Workers
Model















County Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes






















R2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
Sample Size 384 384 360 360 360 360
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Equations alsoinclude intercept terms. Meanof
dependentvariable is 9,385. Observations in columns1-2are for 1976-91; observationsin
columns3-6 asefor 197690.There are 24 countiesinthe sample each year.Table 3
Displacement Effects of PublicRelief Workers
Dependent Variable: Number of Health and Welfare Workers
Model
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Relief Workers Ct-i) -2.26-1.09 0.91-0.460.58 -0.56
(0.39)(0.59)(0.40)(0.62)(0.43)(0.6
County Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
Log Wage (x 1,000) — — 12.6148.7617.45 53.15
(2.02) (26.55)(3.09)(27ATh
Vacancy Rate (x 1.000) — — 343.95375.34 374.06365.43
(146.90) (198.88) (146.39) (199.17)
Unemployment Rate (ii1,000) — — — — 123.91 72.04
(60.21)(73.81)
0.98 0.990.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Sample Size 240 240 216 226 216 216
Notes:Standard errors axe in parentheses. Equations also include intercept teEms.Meanof
dependentvariable is 33,140. Observations in columns 1-2arefor 1982-91; observations in
columns 3-6 axe for 1982-90, There are 24 counties In the sample each year.Table 4




















































































Sample Size 288 288 168 168
Notes: Equations also include county dummies,yeardummies, log average wage, vacancy rate and


































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 .69 .80 .74 .81 .80 .81
Sample Size 264 264 264 364 364 264
Notest Regressions also include constants. Proportion public
sector is the proportion of the laborforceemployed in the public
sector. Vacancy rate is the number of registered vacancies
relative to the labor force. Unemployment rate is the unemployment
rate derived from the registers. UR+Prograss is (Unemployed +Relief
Workers +Numberon Training Programs +Numberon Youth Programs)/Labor
Forge.Table 6: Models for Cross—Country Differences in
















































































sample Size 20 19 20 17
R2—adj. .85 .63 .91 .75
S.E. 1.79296 1.41 2.51
- Motesg
a. standard errors are in parentheses.
b.The AIM spending relative to GDP and 1.121 spending relative
to all labor market program variables pertain to 1987 in
Columns(1) and (3), andavailable years between 1991 and 1993
incolumns (2) and (4) (Source: OECD Employment outlook. 1993).Table 6 ——continued
The change in inflation variable is for 1983 to 1987 in Columns
(1) and (3), and to 1992 to 1993 in Columns (2) and (4)
(Source: OECD Main Economic Inidicators). All other
explanatory variables are fromLayard,Nickell and Jackman
(1991)Table 1: Univariate Models of RelativeEmployment
and Unemployment Across Regions
Coefficienton u.s. Sweden
laggeddependent LogUnemployment A Log Unemployment
variable Employment Rate Employment Rate
(I) (2) (3) (4)
Onelag .492 .899 -.103 1.020
(.023) (.032) (.039) (.051)
Twolags -.099 -.159 -.028 -.289
(.025) (.033) (.038) (.052)
Three lags .010 -.026
(.024) (.024)
Fourlags -.054 — ..003 -
022) (M22)
a, .017 .083 .018 .002
Sample period 1952-90 1972-90 1981-91 1978-92
Imni led Imnulse Resnonses
Year 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Year 2 1.49 .90 .90 1.02
Year3 1.63 .65 .88 .75
Year 4 1.67 .44 .86 .47
YearS 1.62 .29 .86 .26
Year 10 1.52 .04 .86 .00
Year 20 1.53 .01 .86 .00
Note: Models include state dummies (US) or county dummies (Sweden). Columns (1) and (2) arefrom
Blanchard andKatz(1992). Change ia logemploymentand unemploymentrate are measured
relative to national levels.